100th Congress
1st Session

COMMITTEE PRINT

CSCE
100 — 1 — 6

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

UNITED STATES CONGRESS

PHASE II

OF THE

VIENNA REVIEW MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

JANUARY 27—APRIL 10, 1987

Printed for the use of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

73-308

WASHINGTON : 1987

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

J892-8

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CONTENTS

	Page
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY	1
CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITIES	2
NON-GOVERNMENTAL VISITORS IN VIENNA	3
PRESS	4
HIGHLIGHTS OF TRENDS IN THE EASTERN BLOC	5
The Soviet Union	5
Eastern Europe	7
PLENARY	9
Basket I	9
Basket II	10
The Human Dimension (Human Rights Principles and Basket III)	11
DRAFTING GROUPS	12
Basket I—Security	12
Basket I—Human Rights Principles	13
Basket II	14
The Mediterranean	16
Basket III	16
WESTERN HUMAN DIMENSION PROPOSALS	18
Textual Proposals	19
Follow-up Proposals	20
FOLLOW-UP	21
PROSPECTS FOR A THIRD PHASE	21

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Round Two of the Vienna Review Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ran from January 27 through April 10. According to the agenda adopted at the preparatory meeting, the first week was devoted to implementation review and consideration of new proposals for possible inclusion in a concluding document. From February 2, the beginning of the second week, through February 18, the formal focus of the conference was exclusively on proposals, although implementation questions were raised in the context of explaining the introduction of new proposals. Beginning February 19, the five subsidiary working bodies were replaced by drafting groups on the same topics: Basket I—principles and military security; Basket II—economic, scientific and environmental cooperation; Basket III—humanitarian cooperation; Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean; and follow-up activities after Vienna.

As of April 10, close to 140 proposals had been tabled and discussed by the participating States. The NATO countries plus Ireland jointly tabled 16 key proposals centering on human rights principles and the Third Basket. Among these is a proposal for a series of extensive follow-up activities that would culminate in a post-Vienna Conference on the Human Dimension. The Neutral and Nonaligned (NNa) countries advanced proposals of their own which reflected West European values on subjects such as Helsinki monitoring, human contacts and information. The East put forward a flood of proposals in all baskets, a large proportion of which were purely declaratory or propagandistic in nature, with the remainder focusing on cooperative initiatives in the cultural field.

The fundamental Western demand for significant improvement in Eastern human rights compliance has yet to be met. Despite the serious deficiencies in the area of implementation and performance, the flood of proposals put forward by the West, the East and the NNa during Phase II reflected a momentum for additional promises, commitments and meetings unlikely to be hindered by the absence of substantially improved compliance by the East.

Basket I (Security) discussions were made more complex when the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries began informal talks in Vienna on a mandate for conventional force negotiations in mid-February. Formally, outside of the CSCE framework, the NATO and Warsaw Pact representatives provided reports on these talks in the Security ("S") Working Group, which includes representatives of all 35 participating States.

Basket II discussions were characterized by increased calls for cooperative measures to combat pollution, promote tourism and encourage increased business contacts and exchange of economic, commercial and technological information.

In Basket III the frustrated demands for compliance were explicitly set forward by the neutrals. The Austrian-Swiss proposal WT. 9 called for the resolution of all outstanding exit cases before the end of September 1987. The West proposed ambitious, problem-solving and action-oriented proposals focused on the continuing nonimplementation concerns identified during Phase I of the Vienna Meeting. The East searched for areas of cooperation but offered no remedies for the fundamental ongoing problems inhibiting and obstructing the free flow of people, information and ideas.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

The second session of the Vienna Review Meeting saw an increase in congressional participation both at home and in Vienna. Members of Congress participated in plenaries and bilateral discussions with members of several delegations to the Vienna Review Meeting, while at home Congress focused on several issues relating to compliance with the Helsinki Final Act.

A Commission-sponsored delegation led by Chairman Steny Hoyer arrived in Vienna at the beginning of Phase II. The delegation included Commissioner Chris Smith (R-NJ), and Representatives Albert Bustamante (D-TX) and Ben Gilman (R-NY). CSCE Chairman Hoyer addressed the Vienna plenary meeting on February 13. Contrasting the promise of glasnost with reality in the Soviet Union, Hoyer introduced two new human rights proposals on behalf of the West. Proposal WT.38, co-sponsored with Denmark, speaks to the contribution of individuals and groups in the CSCE process; WT.39 addresses the plight of persons in confinement. Hoyer raised several cases emblematic of Eastern abuses in these two areas, including those of Hanna Mikhailenko, Josef Begun, Jiri Wolf and Jan Dus.

Following the plenary, the delegation participated in a press conference and a lengthy bilateral meeting with the Soviet delegation. Again, the implications of glasnost for the human rights outlook in the Soviet Union was a main topic of conversation, as delegation members pointed to disturbing cases and trends in emigration and other human rights areas.

On February 14, Chairman Hoyer, Commissioner Chris Smith and Representative Bustamante met with the Romanian delegation. They discussed a wide range of human rights concerns regarding Romania, noting the grave prospects for Romania's retention of Most-Favored-Nation status.

The delegation went on to Prague for 2 days of talks with Czechoslovak officials and private citizens including representatives of Charter 77 and the Jazz Section.

In the U.S. Congress, Chairman Hoyer and Senator Larry Pressler introduced legislation commending the Czechoslovak human rights group Charter 77 on its 10th anniversary. Also, CSCE Cochairman, Senator Dennis DeConcini, and Commissioner Chris Smith introduced a resolution which focused on the right of families in the Soviet Union and the United States to visit one another, a right guaranteed by the Helsinki Final Act. A resolution which strongly protested the continued violations by the Soviet Union of its international human rights obligations, especially its violations

of the right to emigrate, was introduced into both Chambers of Congress. The introduction was in response to the publication of new Soviet emigration regulations, which many view as a step backwards in certain respects. The resolutions, introduced in the House by Rep. Dante B. Fascell (D-FL), Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and in the Senate by Majority Leader Robert Byrd and Minority Leader Bob Dole passed unanimously in both the House and Senate.

Congressional hearings also focused on many of the issues being discussed in Vienna. Former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Arthur Hartman was joined by Professor Marshall Goldman of Harvard, Peter Reddaway of the Kennan Institute and I.F. Stone (former Washington editor of *The Nation*) at a Commission hearing which discussed the domestic and international implications of *glasnost* in the Soviet Union.

The Commission also heard testimony from Soviet dissident poet and former political prisoner Irina Ratushinskaya. In addition, her husband, Igor Gerashchenko, spoke of the nuclear disaster in Chernobyl.

The House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health and the Environment held a hearing on the exchange of U.S.-Soviet medical research, with a specific emphasis on the Soviet refusal to allow several cancer patients to seek medical treatment in the West.

Near the end of the second phase and on the eve of Chairman Hoyer's scheduled trip with Speaker Jim Wright to Kiev and Moscow, officials of the Soviet Embassy presented Hoyer with a list of 137 cases that they said were resolved. The resolved cases came from 442 names that were initially passed to the Soviets during a bilateral meeting attended by Chairman Hoyer and Cochairman DeConcini in Vienna in November of 1986. This marks the first time that the Soviets have responded directly to a Commission human contacts list.

NON-GOVERNMENTAL VISITORS IN VIENNA

The U.S. delegation received, briefed and assisted a steady but smaller flow of visitors from U.S.-based or U.S.-affiliated human rights advocacy organizations during the second round of the Vienna Meeting. The visitors also met with representatives of other delegations, often including Soviet delegates, and engaged in activities such as demonstrations and press conferences. Among the visitors to Vienna were:

— A group of 10 university presidents and academic leaders who had just returned from Moscow, where they met Dr. Sakharov. The group was led by President Edmond Volpe of the College of Staten Island of the City University of New York;

— A group of scientists from Western Europe and the United States, who conducted a Seminar for Refusenik Scientists. The seminar was moderated by Sir Anthony Williams, who had headed the British delegation to the Madrid and Ottawa CSCE Meetings;

— Nancy Rosenfeld, representing Chicago Action for Soviet Jewry, who travelled to Vienna to welcome Kharkov refusenik activist Yuri Tarnopolsky and his family to the West;

— Joyce Simpson, Director, and other representatives from the Women's Campaign for Soviet Jewry, the "London '35s";

— A group of 21 lawyers from Israel, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States seeking support for Jewish refusenik cases;

— David Harris of the American Jewish Committee;
— A delegation from the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, led by Jerry Goodman, Executive Director, together with Mark Levin, Washington representative, Herbert Teitelbaum, Chairman of National Lawyers Committee for Soviet Jewry, and Sandra Weiner, Chair of the NCSJ's National Advisory Council;
— Lynn Singer, Past President of the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, and Doreen Gainsford of the Women's Campaign for Soviet Jewry from Rehovot, Israel, together with Vladimir Brodsky, former Soviet unofficial peace activist, Leonard Terlitsky, brother of refusenik Mark Terlitsky, Vladimir Magarik, father of imprisoned Jewish activist Alexei Magarik, all of whom welcomed Moscow Jewish activist Lev Blitshtein to the West;
— Rabbis Marvin Heir and Abe Cooper of the Simon Wiesenthal Center;
— Gunars Meierovics and other representatives of the World Federation of Free Latvians;
— Representatives of the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation;
— Dagmar Vaneckova, a Charter '77 signatory living in Austria, and Jan Morawec, both representing the International Society for Human Rights in Czechoslovakia;
— A delegation from the B'nai B'rith International, led by Seymour Reich, President, together with Stephen Roth, representing the World Conference for Soviet Jewry;
— Jerry Bilak of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians;
— Ken Roth of the Helsinki Watch, who had been in Prague to observe the Jazz Section trial;
— Ilana Friedman, sister of longtime refusenik Ida Nudel;
— Rabbi Mark Staitman, member of the Executive Committee of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry;
— Dr. Harold Visotsky, Chairman of the Council on International Affairs of the American Psychiatric Association, and Ellen Mercer of the APA's Committee on International Abuse of Psychiatry and Psychiatrists, accompanied by Dr. Friedrich Weinberger, Chairman of the German Association Against Political Abuse of Psychiatry;
— Charlotte Jacobson, Member of the Chairman's Cabinet of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry and former Hadassah President, with Evelyn Sondheim, NCSJ Treasurer, both of whom serve on NCSJ's Board of Governors;
— Poet and recently-released prisoner of conscience Irina Ratushinskaya and her husband, human rights activist Igor Gerashchenko;
— Recently released prisoners of conscience and Moscow Helsinki monitors Tatiana Osipova and Ivan Kovalev;
— Andrea Wine and Barkley Rosser of the Divided Spouses Coalition.

PRESS

After the initial flurry of attention at the beginning of the Vienna Meeting last November, press coverage has remained at a low but even keel. As with the latter part of Phase I, press coverage of Phase II focused on specific items rather than the overall progress of the meeting itself. European press tended to be more attentive to the meeting, covering CSCE issues and the diplomatic maneuvering; American press generally picked up stories which had an American or East-West angle.

Coverage of the meeting in the major U.S. dailies usually came in the context of the American response to human rights developments in the Soviet Union. The *Washington Post*, for example, reported that Ambassador Zimmermann opened Phase II with a speech questioning the depth of reform in the Soviet Union. Less than a month later, after Moscow had announced the release of 140 political prisoners, the *Post* ran a story headlined "U.S. Lauds Moscow on Human Rights," quoting Ambassador Zimmermann as saying that "fresh winds have begun to blow" in the Soviet Union.

Only occasionally would the American press run an article on the progress of the meeting. A *Los Angeles Times* story at the be-

ginning of Phase II summarized the proposals that would be submitted, saying: "After seven weeks of blunt exchanges over violations of human rights," the meeting "is getting down to detailed work on new proposals and new language to improve the effectiveness of the 1975 agreements on security and cooperation in Europe." This and a few other articles noted the Soviet push for a humanitarian conference in Moscow, as well as Western reservations about it.

Also receiving some coverage was the U.S. delegation's protest over Czechoslovakia's detention of three Charter 77 members who were scheduled to meet with a congressional group led by Chairman Hoyer in Prague in mid-February. Another dispute that gained press attention was the clash between the U.S. and Soviet delegations over the appropriateness of an American tribute to Helsinki Monitor General Pyotr Grigorenko, who died February 21.

The West European press gave more consistent and thorough coverage to the meeting, with a number of issues covered in detail. On the controversy over the role of conventional arms reductions talks in CSCE, press opinion was divided. Press in NATO countries were generally opposed, while papers in neutral and nonaligned nations were more supportive even though wary of diverting attention from human rights concerns. The *Economist* remarked that one result of this issue "is that a lot of people are beginning to ask themselves if conventional arms control is worth trying for at all."

On the proposed Moscow Meeting on humanitarian affairs, West European press sentiment generally agreed with the official Western position that Moscow must meet certain conditions before any such meeting could be held there. As to the duration of the Vienna Meeting, some papers asked whether a prolonged meeting could harm the CSCE process. But as the *Neues Zuricher Zeitung* of Zurich put it, the large number of proposals on human rights is justified "because CSCE rules continue to be respected too little or not at all in the East."

As in the past, East European and Soviet press remained skeptical of U.S. motives, once again seeing human rights as a camouflage for avoiding military security issues. A prominent theme in the Eastern press has been to show support for neutral and nonaligned interests as a way to split them from the West. As a newspaper from Budapest commented, the West has proposed a conventional arms reduction forum that "would simply exclude the great majority of countries participating in the all-European process."

HIGHLIGHTS OF TRENDS IN THE EASTERN BLOC

THE SOVIET UNION

The political prisoner early-release program, announced in February, was the most important Soviet human rights development during this round of the Vienna Meeting. Soviet officials said that 140 political prisoners would be released early and that 140 other prisoner cases were to be "reviewed." As of now, 114 prisoners are known to have been let out early—28 of these were named during plenary and working groups at Vienna (26 by the U.S. and 2 by the U.K.) In addition, five other political prisoners were pardoned in

January, and seven prisoners of conscience were released from psychiatric confinement.

Although this early-release program was viewed as a step in the right direction, it does have major shortcomings: some type of recantation is generally required, only articles 70 and 190-1 (RSFSR Criminal Code) are affected, very few imprisoned believers and nationalists were released, none include the 20 prisoners in Perm Camp 36-1, and few have been let out of psychiatric hospitals. In addition, there are 24 Soviet Helsinki Monitors still in prison. All in all, estimates range from 4,000 to 10,000 political prisoners in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government has indicated that it is reviewing the Soviet criminal codes, including articles 70 and 190-1, with a view to bringing them into line with the new policies and "make them more humane." Furthermore, in what may be a positive sign, a few high-ranking Soviet officials involved in psychiatric abuse have recently been removed from their official positions.

While Soviet authorities still severely limit emigration eligibility, Soviet Jewish emigration levels have risen to 714 in the first 3 months of 1987. In the highest monthly level since late 1981, 470 Soviet Jews left in March. Soviet German and Armenian emigration have also increased. Emigration for other groups is virtually nonexistent.

Despite some positive moves, serious problems remain. New regulations on exit and entry for Soviet citizens and foreigners went into effect on January 1, 1987. These regulations basically codify existing practice. They do not recognize the right to emigrate. Only those Soviet citizens with parents, children, spouses and siblings abroad can apply to leave. In addition, approval from relatives currently living in the U.S.S.R. is needed before exit visas can be granted. The decree effectively and sharply limits emigration, giving Soviet authorities almost unlimited power to deny exit visas and providing no legal mechanisms for challenging decisions.

In late March, two Western Jewish leaders were told by Soviet officials that Moscow would permit emigration of refuseniks and their families—except those denied on security grounds. According to these sources, Soviet Jews with exit visas would travel to Israel via Romania; a procedure will be set up to review denials based on national security; and emigration for family reunification may be expanded beyond the narrow family definition in the new Soviet law.

Glasnost, the new Soviet policy of "openness," has had its greatest impact on culture and journalism. Motivated primarily by domestic reasons, *glasnost's* basic aim may be to win the allegiance of the Soviet intelligentsia, who are viewed by Gorbachev as the transmission mechanism for any potential reforms in Soviet society. Another, though subsidiary, goal of *glasnost* is to improve the Soviet image domestically and internationally.

During the Vienna Meeting, Soviet officials were brought from Moscow for "Western-style" press conferences. After the Soviet prisoner early-release program was announced, several Soviet officials, such as the Soviet and RSFSR Ministers of Justice, and several leading Soviet jurists, took part in Vienna press conferences.

Although Soviet diplomats are now more willing to discuss Soviet human rights problems, *glasnost* has its limits. Soviet officials still deny there are any Soviet political prisoners—and refuse to mention any political prisoners by name. In addition, while *glasnost* permits and encourages criticism and self-criticism, it has yet to be directed at Gorbachev and the party.

EASTERN EUROPE

Phase II of the Vienna Meeting took place against a backdrop of contradictory trends in Eastern Europe which showed, above all, that conditions in those countries and in their bilateral relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union are in flux. As General Secretary Gorbachev's *glasnost* campaign moved forward in the Soviet Union, many in the West and the East sought to determine how far it would reach into Eastern Europe.

Two events which had significant bearing on the Vienna Meeting during this period were the lifting of U.S. economic sanctions against Poland and the trial of the Czechoslovak Jazz Section. Both of these events were addressed in numerous plenary speeches and working group deliberations by members of the United States and other delegations.

The Polish Government's decision in October 1986 to release all political prisoners led to improved church-state relations as well as a better image internationally. In January 1987, General Jaruzelski made an official trip to Italy and the Vatican where he met with Pope John Paul II. This was Jaruzelski's first official trip to a major Western nation since the imposition of martial law in 1981. Following the January visit of Deputy Director of State John Whitehead to Poland, the United States announced the lifting of remaining U.S. sanctions against Poland. With this decision, the President opened the way for restoration of Most-Favored-Nation treatment for Polish exports and Polish eligibility for official credits and credit guarantees. The Reagan administration stated that this decision was taken in the context of a step-by-step process of renewing dialogue with Poland.

The Jazz Section trial took place on March 12 and 13 in Prague. Five members of the Jazz Section of the Czechoslovak Union of Musicians were sentenced for illegal business activities and conspiring to damage Socialist property. Their sentences ranged from 8 months, suspended for 3 years, for two members of the section, to 16 months for the Section's Chairman, Karel Srp. Two other members of the Section were hospitalized at the time of the trial and were scheduled to be tried at a later date.

The trial came during a wave of stepped-up detentions, interrogations and other harassment of signatories to Charter 77, the Czechoslovak human rights manifesto. One signatory, Ervin Motl, was sentenced in February to 3 years in prison, in part for listening to foreign radio broadcasts. Another, Petr Pospichal, has been detained since late January for his contacts with Czechoslovak exiles and members of the Polish Solidarity. And three Charter signatories were detained in mid-February to prevent their meeting with Helsinki Commission Chairman Hoyer and his congressional delegation in Prague.

Nevertheless, there were signs that Czechoslovak authorities would not push ahead with continued prosecutions at least in the very near future. The Jazz Section sentences were considerably lighter than the maximum of 8 years imprisonment under the law on illegal economic activity. And a number of political trials involving Charter signatories which were scheduled to take place in March were postponed indefinitely. Moreover, some Chartists—emboldened by Gorbachev's *glasnost* campaign—met openly without official intervention or recrimination to commemorate the death of one of the heroes of the Czechoslovak human rights movement, Jan Patocka.

Charter 77's higher profile and the postponement of several trials in Czechoslovakia preceded Gorbachev's visit to that country in mid-April, indicating perhaps a leadership ambivalence towards Soviet-style reforms and a citizenry anxious for them.

In Hungary, a much larger demonstration involving private and dissenting citizens took place in Budapest on March 15, the anniversary of Hungary's 1848 Revolution against Austrian rule. Police did not intervene as some 2,000 Hungarian citizens marched from site to site commemorating rebellious moments in Hungarian history. Other positive developments included the granting of an entry visa to a Radio Free Europe correspondent for a working visit to Hungary, and permission for Sandor Racz, a toolmaker who led Hungary's free trade union during the 1956 Revolution, to visit the United States at the end of April on the invitation of the AFL-CIO.

Significantly, these events took place just prior to Hungarian Central Committee Member Matyas Szuros' visit to the United States in March. Szuros held talks with Members of Congress and the administration on a wide range of bilateral and multilateral issues, including CSCE-related topics.

Another East European official to visit the United States was Jozef Czyrek, Foreign Affairs specialist for the Polish Politburo, who led a delegation of Polish parliamentarians in late February and early March, just after President Reagan lifted U.S. sanctions against Poland.

Assistant Secretary of State John Whitehead visited Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria in February. This trip followed a November 1986 visit to Hungary and Romania. His visits were intended as an opening for more active U.S. diplomacy in Eastern Europe.

Phase II saw the eruption of a long-smoldering dispute between Hungary and Romania over Romania's Hungarian minority. During Phase II, the Hungarian delegation co-sponsored a strongly worded Canadian proposal on minority rights—which may be the first time in CSCE history that an Eastern country has ever "crossed over" to co-sponsor a major Western human rights proposal.

Also, in January, six Bulgarian proponents of human rights appealed to the Vienna CSCE Meeting asking that the meeting not conclude until all European peoples are able to exercise their basic rights. The six were detained by Bulgarian authorities and then released, with the possible exception of one whose whereabouts has not been ascertained.

PLENARY

Biweekly plenary sessions which covered the gamut of CSCE issues established the tone and framework for exchanges of views in the various drafting groups. NATO countries worked cooperatively to orchestrate the introduction and exposition of major Western proposals and objectives in plenary. These were then described and defended in greater detail in the drafting groups.

For their part, the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern countries continued to plug *glasnost* and to promote an array of initiatives in all three baskets. At the same time, and with increasing acerbity, the Soviet Union aggressively rebuffed criticism of its human rights record with allegations of mass deficiencies in Western performance. Czechoslovakia, which came under heavy Western criticism for the trial of members of the Jazz Section, was less combative but answered pointed Western interventions in rights of reply. Hungary concentrated on cultural issues and also demonstrated a keen interest in minority issues which clearly stemmed from its concerns for the Hungarian minority in Romania. Poland served as principal sponsor of the East's military security proposal while taking a low key approach on contentious issues and stressing cooperative initiatives. The GDR promoted cooperative proposals in cultural and educational areas and, together with Bulgaria, promoted the Soviet line loyally. Romania followed a somewhat independent path, tabling an inordinately large number of tendentious proposals.

Neutral and Nonaligned delegations introduced and defended their own often novel proposals and asked searching questions of Western and Eastern sponsors about the proposals they had put forward. In particular, the NNa queried the West about the post-Vienna Human Dimension Conference and the East about the Moscow Conference on Humanitarian Cooperation. Sweden took the NNa lead in countering Eastern attempts to equate exit and entry problems, and engaged in a vigorous defense of freedom of movement as a fundamental human right.

BASKET I

On February 3, 1987, Soviet Ambassador Kashlev presented a major statement in plenary of Soviet views on a wide range of security issues. He made it clear that the Soviet Union considers the strengthening of security and real disarmament to be a central direction of the CSCE process. He reiterated the Eastern desire, elaborated in the Budapest Appeal, to lower the level of military confrontation in Europe; reduce the risk of sudden attack; strengthen military and strategic stability; and increase confidence. Toward this end, Kashlev proposed a single mutual reduction of 100,000 to 150,000 troops on each side over a 2-year period. He repeated Soviet support for the Polish proposal (WT.1) regarding confidence-and security-building measures talks, and stressed the right of all participating States, including neutral and nonaligned (NNa) countries, to play an active role in conventional force negotiations.

Kashlev criticized the United States and other Western countries for placing security issues on the back burner. He took particular exception to reference in the Brussels Declaration to asymmetrics

and disparities in conventional forces. The head of the Soviet delegation argued that the NATO position would drag out debate on conventional forces rather than accomplish actual reductions as called for in the Budapest Appeal.

This theme was repeated later in the round when Major General Tatarnikov, addressing the plenary on behalf of the Soviet Union, noted that while the East had introduced a series of security proposals in Vienna, the West had failed to table even a single one. He complained that there was a scanty diet of military issues compared to the "piles of proposals" on Basket III. A number of other Eastern delegations joined in the chorus of criticism. The delegation from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) criticized those delegations which were "preoccupied" with the human dimension, while the Bulgarians pressed for the conference to get on with the practical work of drafting a final document. The Romanian delegation was particularly active but generally unhelpful on security issues and produced a slew of declaratory proposals. The Hungarians praised the first phase of work in Vienna and urged that the meeting move to the "action-oriented" new proposals phase.

Other security issues raised by the East in plenary during the second round included: irresponsible nuclear testing; allegations of U.S. violations of Salt II; the dangers of Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI); and charges that the United States is undermining the ABM treaty.

Several neutral and nonaligned (NNa) states outlined their views on conventional arms negotiations in plenary statements. Noting the progress made at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE), Swedish Ambassador Lidgard expressed support for expansion of the Madrid mandate to include disarmament. He urged that such negotiations take place within CSCE and include participation of the NNa. Yugoslavia also made a strong pitch for including conventional disarmament negotiations within the 35-nation CSCE. Count Ledebur of Liechtenstein demurred on the issue, voicing concern over the application of CSCE rules and procedures to disarmament negotiations.

BASKET II

The U.S. delegation delivered three plenary statements on Basket II issues. The first statement focused on two proposals which the United States co-sponsored: WT.89 on environmental protection, and WT.101 on the development of tourism. Another U.S.-supported proposal (WT.105) dealt with direct contacts and freedom for scientists. In addition, Ambassador Warren Zimmermann delivered a major Basket II speech on March 31, in which he commented on the proposals the United States considered most important to the West and criticized those Eastern proposals which attempted to sidetrack serious discussion of real Basket II issues. Zimmermann took note of the large number of proposals for post-Vienna activities in Basket II, saying that many would merely continue discussions about various issues instead of providing ways to improve compliance with Basket II provisions.

THE HUMAN DIMENSION (HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES AND BASKET III)

In plenary, the United States continued to focus on the continuing implementation concerns identified during the first phase of the Vienna Meeting. Plenary speeches embraced calls for the fundamental freedoms of conscience, expression and movement as set forth in the Helsinki Final Act. The West repeatedly expressed its conviction that implementation of human dimension commitments is critical to the preservation and development of CSCE.

On February 10, Ambassador Zimmermann introduced the West's proposal on freedom of movement, WT.22, which incorporates the text of U.N. Universal Declaration Article 13 on the right of the citizen to leave and return to his or her own country. Zimmermann cited the cancer death of refusenik Inna Meiman as a tragic illustration of the need for such a proposal. On February 13, U.S. Helsinki Commission Chairman Steny Hoyer joined Danish Ambassador Friis-Moller in introducing proposal WT.38 protecting private individuals and independent groups who seek to know and act upon their rights. Hoyer noted that some 30 Helsinki Monitors remain in Soviet prisons, and stressed that existing abuses cast doubt on the promise of *glasnost*. He also stated that in Czechoslovakia, even the promise of *glasnost* is not evident. Hoyer also introduced a second proposal, WT.39, intended to protect individuals from arbitrary arrest, exile, torture, psychiatric abuse and other forms of inhuman or degrading punishment. Among others, he cited the case of psychiatric abuse victim Hanna Mykhailenko. On February 18, Ambassador Samuel G. Wise joined United Kingdom Ambassador O'Keeffe in introducing Proposal WT.74 regarding respect for the privacy and integrity of postal and telephonic communications; Wise stated that governmental interference is the primary cause of problems in this field.

On February 20, Ambassador Zimmermann took stock of progress in implementation and of proposals designed to improve such implementation. While cataloguing constructive actions taken by certain signatory nations, Zimmermann referred to actions by other nations which undercut these forward steps. Once again, he drew the connection between implementation and new proposals, and stressed that implementation is the key element within CSCE.

On February 27, Ambassador Robert Frowick paid tribute to General Petro Grigorenko, a founding member of the Moscow and Ukrainian Helsinki Groups who died in New York on February 22. Frowick noted that the Western proposals on Helsinki monitors, the rights of persons in confinement, psychiatric abuse and the rights of national minorities all embody objectives for which General Grigorenko fought. The U.S. statement prompted a heated Soviet right of reply. Soviet Ambassador Yuri Kashlev accused the United States of attempting to undermine and explode the conference. At issue was both the substance of the U.S. statement and whether, under the rules of procedure and the agreed agenda, implementation questions can appropriately be raised during the drafting stage. A lengthy debate ensued, in which eight Western and three neutral and nonaligned countries supported the U.S. in successfully arguing that these issues can be raised.

On March 13, Ambassador Wise criticized the recent trial and sentencing of Jazz Section members in Czechoslovakia, and called upon government authorities to respect the cultural rights of its people. On March 27, Ambassador Zimmermann reviewed the 14 textual proposals in the human dimension introduced by the West. Arguing that these proposals stem from unfulfilled prior commitments to the Helsinki and Madrid documents, Zimmermann expressed disappointment at statements by some delegations that many Western proposals are *a priori* unacceptable, unserious or provocative. He criticized several Eastern proposals as rationalizing violations of basic Helsinki principles.

In his concluding plenary statement, Ambassador Zimmermann recognized that there had been limited progress in the U.S.S.R., but called for significantly greater implementation of existing commitments in order to reach a successful conclusion of the meeting. Ambassador Zimmermann also cited human rights concerns in Czechoslovakia, including prisoners of conscience and upcoming trials; limitations on human contacts in the German Democratic Republic; Bulgaria's inhibition of religion and the suppression of its Turkish minority; and, Romania's failure to fulfill its Helsinki obligations in the areas of emigration, religion and national minority rights.

The Eastern countries rejected criticism of their human rights records with strong counterattacks on alleged Western violations of social and economic rights.

DRAFTING GROUPS

BASKET I—SECURITY

The subsidiary working body "S" once again served as the focal point for the alternate discussions of military security issues and principles by the 35 participating States. In the military sphere, the Eastern countries used this period to highlight their compliance with the provisions of the Stockholm Document. The United States reiterated concern that the success of the Stockholm Meeting had left the CSCE unbalanced, with security threatening to overshadow efforts to achieve progress in other areas.

The East stressed the need to develop an integrated approach to disarmament within CSCE based upon the Polish proposal (WT.1), which calls for supplementing the Madrid mandate by establishing parallel negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) and conventional force reductions. Both sets of negotiations would take place within the 35-nation forum and extend from the Atlantic to the Urals, according to the Eastern proposals.

The NATO position, outlined in the Brussels Declaration adopted by the NATO foreign ministers on December 12, 1986, calls for negotiations to build upon and expand the results of the Stockholm Conference within the CSCE, and for "distinct" negotiations on a mandate for conventional forces reduction. Although there has been considerable agreement within the Alliance on the basic objectives for these negotiations, significant uncertainty remains on the relationship of these two distinct negotiations to each other and the CSCE process. France, for example has continued to urge that conventional stability talks take place within CSCE. A

number of the neutral and nonaligned have made it clear that they are not interested in direct participation in such negotiations at this time. Others have insisted on a more active and direct role.

Nothwithstanding these differences of view, the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries began informal talks in Vienna on conventional forces in mid-February at NATO's invitation. While outside of the CSCE framework, some of the participants have been drawn from the Vienna Review Meeting delegations. The informal talks, which alternate between Western and Eastern Embassies in Vienna, are aimed at producing a mandate for the full-fledged negotiations on conventional stability. Participation in these informal meetings has been limited to members of the two major alliances, though the NATO and Warsaw Pact representatives have provided progress reports in the "S" working group, which includes representatives from neutral and nonaligned states.

In other discussions in working body "S," several Warsaw Pact countries provided detailed reports on military exercises they conducted during the first round. These reports were used to underscore Eastern compliance with the CSBMs adopted in Stockholm. The East argued that implementation of the Stockholm Document paves the way for the CDE to move into the disarmament stage.

The United States acknowleged that initial implementation of the Stockholm-negotiated CSBMs was superior when compared to the record under the Final Act. Welcoming the advances made in Stockholm, the U.S. delegation again stressed the need for significantly improved compliance with existing human rights commitments, which the United States considers an integral element of security in Europe. Other security issues during the round included: the establishment of nuclear free zones; nuclear testing; and U.S.-Soviet bilateral negotiations on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF).

Toward the end of the round, the East expressed increasing frustration that the Western countries had not tabled a single security proposal in Vienna. The NATO countries responded that their position on military security matters was outlined in the Brussels Declaration. The Soviets and other Eastern countries have made it clear that little progress can be expected in other areas until outstanding security issues are resolved.

BASKET I—HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES

In the working group discussions on the human rights principles of Basket I, delegations first commented on the course of the implementation review. In remarks characteristic of Western views, the United States said "implementation review has been notably straightforward and thus realistic." The East was keen to prove its business-like attitude—to get on with the meeting—and to call a halt to Western criticism of its record.

A major theme of discussion was the issue of balance between the human rights principles and security and of the relative importance of the various Final Act principles. Early on, the United States observed that keeping balance between human rights and security concerns is the particular province of the "S" group. Responding to Eastern objections, the United States noted that it paid more atten-

tion to Principles II, VII and VIII because they are most often violated. In turn, the East sponsored a proposal which reiterated the "interrelationship" and the "indivisibility" of all Final Act principles, equating civil and political with economic and social rights. In rejecting this proposal, the United States said that "civil and political rights are fundamental and inalienable. They represent individual rights which our governments cannot provide."

The Western human rights textual proposals on Basket I subjects concern the fundamental rights of individuals, such as religious liberty, minority rights, Helsinki monitoring and membership in independent groups, persons in confinement and freedom of movement. By contrast, Eastern textual proposals usually are couched in vague and general language, focusing on broad social and economic rights. For example, the East has sponsored new proposals on the right to work and ending unemployment, the problem of the homeless, on illiteracy, and on hunger.

In turn, the West cited specific Eastern problem areas, punctuated with illustrative cases. When positive steps were taken by the East, such as the early release of some 110 Soviet political prisoners, the West took note. Human rights problems—such as the plight of imprisoned Soviet Helsinki monitors or emigration denials—were also raised to explain the introduction of various Western proposals. When the West was criticized by the East, it tried to respond factually, but seldom succeeded in drawing the Eastern side into a real dialogue.

During the subsidiary working group "S" sessions on principles, the United States made 11 presentations. Extensive statements were given on freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief; the contributions of individuals and groups to the CSCE process; national minorities; postal and telephone communications; persons in confinement, including data on eight U.S. cases raised by the Soviets; the unity of rights under the Final Act, plus responses to various Eastern proposals; and freedom of movement. The U.S. delegation raised a total of 25 individual cases in the working group, involving prisoners of conscience and refuseniks.

BASKET II

Basket II proposals covered numerous topics ranging from trade and industrial cooperation, to scientific exchanges, to environmental problems and the promotion of tourism.

During the first week of the Vienna Meeting, the implementation review phase continued in the Basket II subsidiary working body. Two meetings focused on what are referred to as "Other Topics," namely cooperation in areas of transport, migrant labor, personnel training and tourism. Two meetings consisted of general discussions.

The discussion of "Other Topics" focused mostly on tourism. With a stress on the importance of tourism to the economies of the participating States, in particular the employment opportunities and the national income it generates, several Western delegations noted many problems in East-West travel and an imbalance in tourist flows favoring Western travel to the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. The West described in detail the

many difficulties faced by citizens of Eastern countries in attempting to travel to the West. Eastern delegations attacked these statements as confrontational, citing steps their governments had taken to promote tourism, and gave a review of alleged Western "administrative and psychological" barriers to Eastern tourists.

Several other delegations spoke on the issue of transport in Europe, noting both some progress but also remaining difficulties in this area. A few delegations also spoke on personnel training. Then, in the last 2 days of general discussion in the subsidiary body, a variety of topics were discussed, such as the role of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) in acting upon Basket II provisions. A U.S. summary statement reviewed Eastern noncompliance in many Basket II areas and argued that new proposals should be designed to improve compliance with existing provisions and not to create a new set of commitments in Basket II fields.

During the remainder of the round, a large number of proposals (about 45) focusing on Basket II topics were tabled. In the economic field, Western proposals addressed areas of continued concern, such as the lack of business contacts (proposal WT.117) and economic and commercial information (WT.118) in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. A U.S. proposal on compensation transactions (WT.115), also known as countertrade, builds upon the relevant provisions of the Madrid Concluding Document and has widespread support from other Western and NNa delegations. Other Western economic proposals include those on commercial arbitration (WT.107), trade in services (WT/E.6), and a proposal introduced by the members of the European community for a CSCE conference on economic cooperation (WT.58).

In the field of science and technology, the primary Western proposal (WT.105) calls for more direct contacts between scientists from different states as well as greater respect for their rights. There is also a proposal promoting the establishment of safeguards in the field of biotechnology (WT/E.5) and a proposal for convening a Scientific Forum in Erice, Italy (WT.64). A general proposal on environmental protection (WT.89), makes practical and responsible suggestions on air and water pollution, the consequences of industrial accidents, the transport of toxic and dangerous wastes, and the management of natural resources. There is also a proposal encouraging further steps in the area of nuclear safety (WT/E.8). On other topics, there is a proposal on migrant labor in Europe (WT.119) and on the promotion of tourism (WT.101).

Many of the proposals originating from Eastern delegations not only call for eliminating controls on the transfer of technology but actually seek Western commitments to promote this transfer actively. They also focus on aspects of Western trade policies which they refer to as obstacles to trade.

Although some NNa delegations have proposals in other areas, most of the NNa effort has gone to the field of environmental protection. In particular, the Nordic countries, consisting of both neutral and NATO-member delegations, introduced a set of proposals calling for increased action by the participating States in protecting various aspects of the regional and world environment.

There are at least 10 proposals for follow-up activities in Basket II, most of them coming from Eastern and NNa delegations. From the discussions in the Basket II subsidiary group, the most impor-

tant of these include an Economic Conference and Scientific Forum proposed by the EC, a proposed Economic Forum to be held in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and a Bulgarian proposal for the convening of an Ecological Forum.

In the Basket II subsidiary group, the U.S. delegation elaborated on priority Western proposals discussed in plenary, such as environmental protection; tourism; business contacts; economic and commercial information; scientific cooperation; and countertrade. In introducing the countertrade proposal, the United States noted that many of the problems created by countertrade limit expansion of beneficial and economically sound East-West trade. The U.S. delegation argued that its proposal suggests specific measures to maximize flexibility and thereby minimize many existing problems. The West also questioned the seriousness of Eastern proposals which attempt to sidetrack discussion from substantive Basket II issues. Regarding possible Basket II follow-up activities, the U.S. delegation stressed that some proposals call for work that could be or is currently being done at the ECE, while others are simply unnecessary in terms of resolving concrete problems.

THE MEDITERRANEAN

Two proposals were introduced in the subsidiary working group on the Mediterranean during the second round of the Vienna Meeting, both of which called for follow-up activities. Malta, Cyprus and Yugoslavia sponsored a proposal for a comprehensive conference on issues of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean to be held in Valletta, Malta. This initiative stresses security issues in the Mediterranean, particularly arms reductions. The other proposal was introduced by Spain and a number of other Western and neutral countries and calls for a conference on Mediterranean ecosystems, to be held in Palma de Mallorca.

The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies continued through this round to criticize U.S. military deployments and activities in the Mediterranean. All of the Eastern countries (except Hungary) also supported the Maltese-Yugoslav-Cypriot proposal for a conference on Mediterranean security and cooperation issues. The Spanish proposal was supported enthusiastically by Italy, but met with only random comment from other quarters. Both Italy and the United States spoke against the Maltese proposal on the grounds that its attempt to include in the conference a variety of issues and participants not among CSCE states is both impracticable and inappropriate in the CSCE process.

After introducing their proposal, Malta and its co-sponsors kept relatively silent for the remainder of the round. It is expected, however, that in keeping with the past, they will become more active and vocal as the review meeting proceeds to actual drafting of a concluding document.

BASKET III

After the first week of implementation review, the tabling and discussion of proposals in the human contacts, information, cultural and educational fields became the focus of the work of "H" Group. As had been the case at the Madrid Meeting, once the

drafting phase had begun, the United States and other Western delegations returned to implementation themes such as the new Soviet exit-entry legislation, developments connected with *glasnost*, as well as the Jazz Section and other human rights trials in Czechoslovakia—all in order to demonstrate the need for compliance with existing provisions.

The United States, the United Kingdom and Canada typically were among the most vocal proponents of the West's general humanitarian concerns, while other Western delegations participated actively on proposals in areas of particular interest. In the course of the second round, the United States representatives delivered 17 speeches in which individual cases of divided spouses, separated families, exit visa denials, obstacles to minority contacts, telephone and postal interference, jamming, censorship and harassment of journalists were cited as examples of continuing problems.

The East's Third Basket proposals roughly can be divided into two groups: those presented for propagandistic effect, and those calling for cooperative efforts largely in cultural areas. The Moscow Conference proposal continues to be the East's primary Basket III initiative. Yet, the Soviet Union and other Eastern supporters have not adequately responded to repeated neutral and Western inquiries regarding the precise agenda, duration or framework for the meeting. The general descriptions of the proposed Conference would seem to indicate that the possible topics for discussion could include the usual Basket III items as well as socio-economic issues such as unemployment and homelessness. In response to criticism and to counter Western textual proposals, the East criticized the United States and other Western countries for restrictive entry procedures, homelessness, unemployment, manipulative control of the media, and failure to ensure the physical safety of visiting cultural figures in the United States.

The United States devoted the largest number of speeches to the troubled area of human contacts. The Federal Republic of Germany also focused chief attention on the West's human contacts proposals governing both exit procedures and the humanitarian consideration of cases—concerns which were of particular interest at the Bern Human Contacts Meeting. The Western human contacts proposal on noninterference with postal and telephonic communications has drawn two neutral sponsors, Austria and Switzerland.

The neutrals vigorously defended their own proposals, some of which contained novel elements. The interesting Austrian-Swiss proposal, WT.9, on human contacts calls for the resolution of all outstanding exit cases before the end of September 1987 as well as other measures geared toward sustained implementation of past commitments. An all-out Eastern bid to equate the fundamental right to leave one's country, as embodied in the U.N. Universal Declaration, with a purported "right to enter," proved to be the major thrust of Eastern efforts in human contacts, a bid which was roundly rebuffed by the neutrals as well as the West.

In addition to the two Western proposals on Information, one textual and the other regarding a post-Vienna Forum, the neutral and nonaligned proposal, WT. 44, on Information which contains both textual and follow-up elements, addresses issues such as jamming, the treatment of journalists and censorship. It also provides

a comprehensive mandate for a post-Vienna Information Forum that complements the Western follow-up proposal in key respects.

Most Eastern proposals in the information area rationalize state control over information flow. The Eastern offerings justify jamming, censorship and restrictions on foreign journalists. Forward-looking elements in the East's information proposals attempt to exploit new technologies in the mass communications field and call for new cooperative measures, such as exchanges of media specialists. However, the Eastern proposals offer no remedies for the fundamental ongoing problems inhibiting and obstructing East-West information flow.

By far the largest number of Third Basket proposals put forward concern culture and education. A number of these enjoy joint Eastern and neutral sponsorship and are cooperative in content. One follow-up proposal for a post-Vienna seminar in Cracow on cultural heritage has attracted sponsors from all country groupings, Western, Eastern and neutral. In coming months it will be important for the West to resist Eastern efforts to flood the meeting with the more easily negotiated cultural and other cooperative proposals which ignore more central Western concerns in the human dimension. To this end, the U.S. delegation has indicated that it will consider the cooperative proposals in culture and education "in light of our experience at the Cultural and Scientific Forums and of the pre-eminent importance the U.S. delegation attaches to the proposals in human rights and human contacts" which the West has advanced.

WESTERN HUMAN DIMENSION PROPOSALS

Among the nearly 140 proposals put forward to date by Western, neutral and nonaligned and Eastern countries are a series of 16 human dimension proposals (14 textual proposals, i.e. texts that would form the body of a Vienna Concluding Document, and two proposals for post-Vienna follow-up activities) that were drafted and endorsed by 17 Western countries, i.e. all NATO member states plus Ireland. These ambitious, problem-solving and action-oriented proposals are focused on the continuing implementation concerns that were identified during the first phase of the Vienna Meeting.

This important group of proposals constitutes the core of the Western approach to human rights and humanitarian affairs issues in Vienna. The 16 proposals have been characterized by Ambassador Zimmermann as the most comprehensive set of proposals advanced by the West in the human dimension of the CSCE since the signing of the Final Act.

As Ambasssador Zimmermann said in his March 27 plenary speech: "Their scope is as broad as our concerns are deep. They embrace the fundamental freedoms of conscience, expression and movement and they embody shared Western values—values which are also reflected in the Helsinki Final Act. Our proposals express the strong Western conviction that implementation of human dimension commitments is critical to the preservation and development of CSCE as a force for genuine security and cooperation."

A brief description of the 16 proposals follows:

TEXTUAL PROPOSALS

The majority of the 14 textual proposals fall under Principle VII and the human contacts provisions of Basket III, the portions of the Final Act where compliance has been poorest and where violations of the Helsinki Agreements most directly affect individuals.

The West's proposal on *Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion or Belief* would require the enactment or repeal of legislation in order to prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion; provide for freedom to receive religious education as well as to receive, obtain and use needed religious materials and publications; provide for freedom to establish and maintain places of worship adequate to the requirements of believers; and would recognize the right to establish and maintain religious contacts.

Proposal WT.27 on *National Minorities* would require states to ensure that persons belonging to national minorities are not victims of discrimination and that the unique identity of such groups is protected. A related proposal, WT.62, sponsored by Canada and supported by a number of Western countries including the United States, would remove obstacles impeding minority contacts.

WT.38 on the *Contribution of Individuals and Groups* further elaborates the Helsinki and Madrid commitments affecting unofficial monitors and nongovernmental organizations, issues that are, in the West's view, central to the CSCE process. The proposal calls for removal of obstacles to the monitoring of implementation, to investigating alleged violations, and to expressing views on CSCE matters.

WT.39 on the rights of *Persons in Confinement* addresses the Helsinki commitment to respect the dignity of the human person and requires the state to safeguard the citizen against miscarriages of justice and cruel or harmfully inappropriate treatment by the state. It would prohibit torture, psychiatric abuse, arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. Also, WT.39 provides for maximum possible access on humanitarian grounds by relatives, friends and others as well as increased opportunities for access to legal proceedings.

WT.22 on *Freedom of Movement* incorporates the fundamental rights in this area set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Among other actions, it calls for the abolition of the exit visa and other procedural impediments to the right to leave one's own country and return to it. In cases where the state restricts movement, rights of appeal are provided for in the proposal.

Proposals WT.23, 24, 53 and 51 all concern *Human Contacts* and offer practical remedies for existing problems. The contents of these proposals stem from the Western draft document tabled at the Bern Human Contacts Experts Meeting. The proposals concern exit procedures; the humanitarian consideration of cases; the treatment of dual nationals; the elimination of undue obstacles in the path of settlement in the country of choice; permission for families to travel together if they wish; and cessation of the widespread Eastern practice of denying exit permission to family members because of a relative's actions.

Proposal WT.74 tackles the problem of interference with *Postal and Telephonic Communication.*

Proposal WT.56 embraces the range of implementation issues in the field of *Information* and provides for wider access to information of all kinds to citizens of East and West. It would remove all obstacles to seeking, receiving and imparting such information, including jamming. Further, it would prevent punitive measures against citizens for gathering, possessing or distributing information; protect citizens in exercising their right to know and to freedom of expression by ensuring that classified information is designated as such; and would help journalists pursue their legitimate professional interests without interference.

Proposals WT.29 and 54 on *Culture* and WT.57 on *Education*, derive from the Western paper tabled at the Budapest Cultural Forum and would facilitate greater freedom of creation, dissemination, cooperation and contacts in the arts, academia and sciences.

FOLLOW-UP PROPOSALS

The two Western proposals for post-Vienna events, one a multifaceted regime of activities culminating in a Conference on the Human Dimension, and another calling for an Information Forum, could serve as a useful means of extending human dimension interests beyond Vienna.

In putting forth these proposals and in setting acceptable standards for others, the U.S. delegation has taken the position that follow-up meetings must promote the central aims of the Final Act and be consistent with the criteria of relevance and balanced progress. Furthermore, the necessary conditions under which follow-up meetings take place are that (1) maximum possible openness and access be afforded private individuals, nongovernmental representatives and journalists, as well as citizens of the host country and (2) the host government of any follow-up meeting should have not only a demonstrable record of interest in the subject to be discussed, but an exemplary record of performance. U.S. representatives in Vienna have made it clear that these requirements would apply to the Polish-Austrian proposal (WT.6) for a symposium on cultural heritage in Cracow as well as to the Soviet proposal for a conference on humanitarian cooperation in Moscow (WT.2).

The key Western follow-up proposal in the Human Dimension, WT.19, sets forth a far-reaching and variegated post-Vienna system of "new, concrete, precise and intensive efforts" to improve implementation in this field. The proposal foresees monitoring of compliance by officials as well as private individuals and groups; sharing of information on matters of implementation; bilateral and multilateral opportunities for governments to discuss human dimension concerns; and a mechanism for dealing with pressing problems as they arise. These complementary and successive activities would be the basis for continuing action that would culminate in a stock-taking meeting to be followed by a Conference on the Human Dimension at an appropriate time and place before the next follow-up meeting.

Proposal WT.45 mandates a post-Vienna Information Forum involving the participation of leading representatives of the media. The Forum would provide an opportunity for discussion of issues such as freer and wider information flow, jamming, working condi-

tions for journalists, access to and dissemination of information on an unofficial as well as an official basis, media reciprocity, and new technologies and cooperative measures in the information field.

FOLLOW-UP

Whether to meet at all has been replaced by discussions centering on where, when and under what conditions follow-up meetings will occur. Thirty proposals for specific follow-up meetings have been tabled and discussed in the subsidiary groups.

Some of the discussion has centered around the issue of the site for future CSCE meetings. Eastern delegations have argued that there is a growing imbalance in the location of meetings favoring the West, which they view as a possible violation of the principle of rotation set forth in the Final Act. They argue that those states which have not hosted a meeting should be favored over those which have. Acceptance of the Soviet proposal for a humanitarian conference in Moscow and the Czechoslovak proposal for an economic forum in Prague were presented as ways to redress the imbalance.

Western delegations rejected the contention that there is an established principle of automatic rotation of meetings between states of different blocs since the concept of grouping states into blocs is alien to the Final Act, arguing instead that the location of a meeting is a decision to be reached by consensus. In addition, Western representatives said that the choice of meeting sites was a decision which required consideration of several important factors such as favorable working conditions for journalists and nongovernmental organizations as well as for official delegates. Moreover, the site should be suitable to the subject matter of the meeting, including the host state having an exemplary record in the area to be discussed. The Eastern delegations responded to these arguments by accusing the West of setting arbitrary "preconditions" to the acceptance of Eastern follow-up proposals.

In an April 3 plenary statement, the U.S. delegation expressed concern that the large number of proposals for follow-up activities risks substituting meetings for implementation, which could result in a loss of purpose and public support for the CSCE process. Ambassador Zimmermann stressed that agreement to no more than six follow-up activities, the number that followed Madrid, would be a serious, fiscally responsible result. The United States then suggested three meetings—a follow-up to build upon the results of the Stockholm CDE, activities leading up to a Conference on the Human Dimension of CSCE as proposed in WT.19, and an Information Forum as suggested in WT.45—as promoting the central aims of the Final Act.

PROSPECTS FOR THE THIRD PHASE

Notwithstanding the further need to discuss and digest the numerous proposals which have already been tabled and the few yet to come, the third session of the Vienna Meeting (May 5-July 31) should see the beginning of actual drafting work on a concluding document soon after the meeting resumes. Corridor conversation about the creation of informal drafting groups and the appoint-

ment of coordinators from the neutral countries to guide the work met with general agreement from all sides during the final days of the last session. Assuming that no major controversies develop over the selection of the specific coordinators for the various drafting groups, the informal machinery could be in place and functioning by the second or third week of the third phase.

Once actual drafting begins, the meeting is committed to try to produce a concluding document by the agreed target of July 31, 1987. Although there is still considerable skepticism that this date will be met, given all that remains to be done and the notable lack of movement in some areas such as military security—the target is being taken increasingly seriously. This is true largely because Western and Eastern delegations all have shown determination to work purposefully and intensively during the 13 remaining weeks of the coming session. If it does not prove possible to agree on a concluding document for the Vienna Meeting by July 31, it is likely that the participants will agree on a recess until sometime in late September or early October.

A number of factors will affect the pace of the drafting work and the possibility of concluding the meeting by July 31 or not long afterward. One important element will be the progress achieved in the separate negotiations on conventional arms reductions by the 23 members of the NATO and Warsaw Pact Alliances. There are indications, given the interest of the Warsaw Pact states and some NNa and Western nations to forge a close connection between these talks and the CSCE process, that these countries will object to the Vienna Meeting ending before agreement is reached on a mandate for the conventional arms talks. In a purely substantive sense, agreement on such a mandate would not appear to be a difficult or lengthy task.

A second consideration on the military security side affecting the duration of the Vienna Meeting is the length of time required to reach agreement on a mandate for additional negotiations on military confidence- and security-building measures. The first phase of negotiations was conducted in Stockholm between the Madrid and Vienna Follow-up Meetings. Again there appears to be no insuperable technical obstacles standing in the way of this negotiation. In both this sphere and in the area of the conventional arms negotiations, the primary factor will be political will. The interplay of these two security negotiations will continue to play an important role in the Vienna meeting.

Still a third factor which will influence the length of the Vienna Meeting is the implementation record of the Soviet Union and its allies, particularly in the area of human rights and human contacts. While the Western and NNa countries have all welcomed the progress made to date under the aegis of *glasnost*, they are virtually unanimous in insisting that much more must be done in such areas as release of political prisoners, increased emigration, family reunification and cessation of jamming. In addition, for the Vienna Meeting to come to an early and successful conclusion, there is a general insistence in the Western and NNa delegations that there must be some credible assurance, in the form of institutional changes in the U.S.S.R. or in CSCE follow-up mechanisms or whatever, that human rights implementation of the Helsinki commit-

ments will continue after the Vienna Meeting ends. These two elements—major implementation progress before the end of the Vienna Meeting and assurance of continued progress thereafter—are fundamental requirements for the United States and most Western nations.

Finally, there is the need for balance in the Vienna outcome among the three major areas of human rights, trade and military security. For the West, human rights and military security must receive major and roughly equal treatment in the concluding document and in whatever follow-up activities are agreed upon. In the view of the United States, such follow-up activities must be limited in number, addressed to serious subjects and aimed at improved implementation of the Final Act and Madrid commitments.

It is not clear now that all these requirements can be met by July 31. It is clear, however, that the Soviet Union and its allies want to end the Vienna meetings as soon as possible consistent with their goals in the realm of military security. Whether they are prepared to pay—and pay quickly—the price in human rights terms for such an outcome is still uncertain. Whatever develops during the next session at Vienna, the United States and other Western nations are committed to remain at the meeting for as long as it takes to obtain a positive result consistent with the objectives for sustained implementation of human rights and other CSCE commitments.